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STATEMENT OF THE TSSTIES 
1. Did the District Court erroneously determine that 
Officer Howard seized Schlosser or searched the car in violation 
of the Utah and United States Constitution when he opened the car 
door and asked for identification? 
2. Did the District Court erroneously apply a probable 
cause standard to an investigative detention when Terry v. Ohio. 
392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982); permit 
such stops based upon a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a 
suspect had been, was or was about to be engaged in criminal 
activity? 
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretionn by 
finding that the investigatory detention if there was a 
detention, and subsequent search of Schlosser was a substantial 
violation of his constitutional rights under both the Utah and 
United States Constitutions that was committed in bad faith? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t , 
- v -
ANTHONY PRICE SCHLOSSER, 
and HARRIS LOWDER, 
Defendants -Respondents . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendants S c h l o s s e r and Lowder were charged w i t h 
unlawful p o s s e s s i o n of more than 16 ounces of marijuana f a 
c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e f a t h i r d - d e g r e e f e l o n y f i n v i o l a t i o n of 
Utah Code Ann. § 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 ( 2 ) (a) ( i ) (Supp. 1 9 8 5 ) . 
Defendants were bound over t o s tand t r i a l a f t e r a 
p r e l i m i n a r y hear ing on J u l y 3 f 1 9 8 5 , i n t h e J u s t i c e Court f in 
and f o r Nephi P r e c i n c t f Juab County f S t a t e of Utah, the Honorable 
Lane Harward, p r e s i d i n g . On J u l y 9 , 1 9 8 5 , defendant Lowder moved 
t o s u p p r e s s a l l the e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t him and on J u l y 15 f d e f e n d -
ant S c h l o s s e r j o i n e d i n t h a t motion (R. 1 2 f 1 7 ) . On September 3 f 
1985 Judge Ray Harding denied d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r f a i l u r e t o 
submit memoranda (R. 2 8) . Defendants submit ted a memorandum on 
October 8 , 19 85 i n support of t h e i r motion t o suppress (R. 30) 
and t h e S t a t e responded on October 2 4 , 1985 (R. 5 2 ) . On October 
2 9 , 19 85, Judge Harding waived ora l argument of t h e motion 
(R. 6 6 ) . On November 1 2 f 1985 Judge Harding r u l e d i n favor of 
de fendant s and f on January 1 2 , 1986 , he ordered t h a t the 
Case No. 860061 
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evidence be suppressed (R. 6 7 , 6 8 - 7 0 ) . 
T h e r e a f t e r t h e S t a t e f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r 
i n t e r l o c u t o r y appeal from t h e Suppress ion Order i n t h i s Court 
on Janua ry 2 9 , 1986. This Court g ran ted the p e t i t i o n on Febru-
a ry 2 5 , 1986. 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
On May 1 7 , 1985 a t 3:00 - 4:00 p.m. Trooper Howard of 
t he Utah Highway P a t r o l c locked a pickup t ruck wi th two occupants 
t r a v e l l i n g 44 m.p .h . in a 30 m.p .h . zone in Nephi , Utah (R. 8 6 ) . 
Trooper Howard, a man wi th 11 y e a r s of law enforcement 
exper ience f s i g n a l e d t h e pickup t r u c k t o p u l l over (R. 85 , 8 7 ) . 
As he fol lowed the t ruck f be fo re i t s topped, Trooper Howard saw 
t h e passenger moving around; bending forward and t o t h e r i g h t and 
l e f t as i f he were t r y i n g t o hide something (R. 88 , 102-103, 
1 0 6 ) . Immediately upon s topping t h e t r u c k , t he d r i v e r , H a r r i s 
Lowder, hopped out and met Howard between the t ruck and Howard's 
p a t r o l car wi th d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e and r e g i s t r a t i o n in hand (R. 87-
8 8 , 1 0 1 , 106) . Based on p a s t expe r i ence and the a c t i o n s of the 
two occupan t s ; one f i d g e t i n g around and nervous ly g lanc ing back 
a t Howardf the o t h e r immediately moving away from the t r u c k ; 
Howard concluded t h a t t h e r e was something i n t h e t ruck t h e 
occupants did not want him to see (R. 88 , 103 , 105) . 
For these r ea sons , Howard decided t o i n v e s t i g a t e 
f u r t h e r and check on the p a s s e n g e r ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (R. 89 , 104-
1 0 5 ) . Howard walked t o t h e f r o n t of t he t r u c k , passenger s i d e , 
and tapped on the c losed window (R. 103-104) . Receiving no 
r e sponse , he opened t h e passenger door and asked t h e passenge r , 
Anthony S c h l o s s e r , f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (R. 103-104) . 
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As Howard opened the door, he observed in plain view a 
small plastic bag containing what appeared to be marijuana inside 
a bulging, elasticized pocket attached to the door (R. 89f 99f 
105). Howard also smelled the distinct odor of marijuana (R. 89, 
105-106). Howard asked for Schlosser's identification and asked 
him to step out of the truck (R. 89). Howard asked Schlosser if 
there were any weapons in the truck (R. 90
 f 97f 107). Schlosser 
responded that there was a .38 pistol in the glove box and 
started to reach for it (R. 90 , 97) . Howard told Schlosser not 
to open the glove box, just step out of the truck (R. 90). 
Howard reached in and retrieved an unloaded .38 pistol (R. 90, 
92, 97) and shells (R. 92). 
Howard also asked Schlosser to remove an object he saw 
bulging in Schlosser1s pants pocket (R. 90, 110-111). Schlosser 
removed a stone marijuana pipe from his pocket (R. 90, 110). 
Howard then arrested both Lowder and Schlosser for possession of 
a controlled substance and told them to stand in front of the 
pickup truck (R. 91, 97). He did not handcuff them or frisk them 
(R. 97,. 110). He returned to his patrol car and called for 
backup officers who responded within minutes (R. 91, 110). 
When the backup officers arrived, Howard asked the 
suspects if there were any more weapons in the truck (R. 91). 
He did this to protect himself and any other people in the area 
(R. 97). One of the men said there was a .22 rifle behind the 
seat (R. 91, 97). When Howard pulled the seat forward to check 
the rifle, which he found was unloaded, he also discovered a 
brown paper sack (R. 91, 97) . Inside the sack were three larger 
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bags of marijuana (R. 91) . After the truck was impounded, during 
an inventory search f another small bag of marijuana was also 
discovered in the t ruck, possibly in the d r i v e r ' s door 
compartment, along with other drug paraphernalia and some "speed" 
t a b l e t s (R. 93, 94, 98, 112-117, 121). 
Defendants moved to suppress the marijuana tha t was 
discovered by Trooper Howard (R. 12, 17, 30-51). Judge Ray M. 
Harding, Sr. character ized the bas is of the motion as lack of 
probable cause to se ize or search Schlosser (see Appendix A) . 
Judge Harding then found tha t the off icer had no va l id reason to 
order Schlosser out of the truck or to search Schlosser and t h a t 
any act ion Trooper Howard took "was based on a mere suspicion 
tha t the defendant was engaged in criminal a c t i v i t y . " Finding 
tha t a l l of the evidence was discovered as a r e s u l t of an i l l e g a l 
detention and search, and t h a t the detention and search 
subs t an t i a l ly v io la ted defendant 's cons t i tu t iona l r igh t s and was 
not in good f a i t h , Judge Harding suppressed the evidence (R. 6 8-
70) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The action of Trooper Howard in walking up to the car, 
opening the door and questioning the passenger was not a search 
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, nor should it be under 
Art. I § 14 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, there was no 
violation of Schlosser1s constitutional rights and the evidence 
was erroneously suppressed. 
Even if Trooper Howard detained Schlosser, it was 
because he entertained a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
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a c t i v i t y . Under the Fourth Amendmentf Art. I § 14 and Dtah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-15, an off icer may seize a person he reasonably 
suspects of criminal a c t i v i t y . Under the circumstances of t h i s 
case f Trooper Howard was j u s t i f i e d in detaining Schlosser and the 
lower court erroneously suppressed the evidence. 
Al te rna t ive ly , if Trooper Howard did not en te r t a in a 
reasonable su sp i c ion the in t rus ion on Schlosser ' s cons t i tu t iona l 
and s ta tu to ry r igh t s was minimal and not subs tan t ia l or in bad 
f a i t h . Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12 (g) , then, the evidence 
was erroneously suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE OFFICER'S 
ACTION IN APPROACHING SCHLOSSER 
WAS NOT A SEARCH OR SEIZURE. 
This Court recently expressed concern about the f a i l u re 
of the pa r t i e s to brief relevant s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l questions 
in criminal cases f pa r t i cu l a r ly in the area of search and 
se izure , see State v. Ear l , 30 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 , 4 (1986); ££&££ 
v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J . , 
concurr ing) . The Sta te wi l l f i r s t address the question of 
whether the ana lys is of the o f f i c e r ' s ac t ions in t h i s case should 
differ under Art. I § 14 of the Utah Consti tut ion from a fourth 
amendment ana lys is even though the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ru l ing assumes 
tha t the analys is i s the same as t ha t applied under the Fourth 
Amendment (See Appendix A). 
First, although this Court suggested that the state 
constitutional standard could be construed to expand 
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constitutional protection beyond that mandated by the United 
States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment JELaxlr 30 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 4; Hygh. 711 P.2d at 271-73 (Zimmermanf J., 
concurring), the Court has traditionally construed Art. I § 14 
and the Fourth Amendmentr which textually are nearly identical/ 
as providing the same scope of protection. £££ e.g.. State v. 
Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); State v. Lopes, 
552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976). This may explain, to a certain extent, 
the absence of any independent discussion of Art. I § 14 by the 
parties in previous search and seizure cases before this Court 
and by the lower court in this case. Recognizing, of course, 
that the Court may be rethinking its past application of Art. I, 
§ 14, it is the State1s position that there is no good reason 
why, in this case, the Court should construe the Utah 
constitutional provision more narrowly than the Fourth Amendment 
has been interpreted so as to characterize Officer Howard's 
action as a search or seizure. 
Because it is the State's position that the analysis of 
this case under Art. I § 14 should be the same as that under the 
Fourth Amendment, the remainder of this argument does not 
separately analyze the two constitutions but treats them as if 
the same analysis applied to both. 
Under both constitutional provisions, Trooper Howard 
did not engage in a search or seizure. There are three separate 
levels of police encounters with the public. They are: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
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officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; howeverf the detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 498-499 (1983). 
United States v, Mecritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th cir. 1984). 
Trooper Howard1s initial approach toward Schlosser fits 
within the first category listed above. Schlosser was not 
initially detained against his will and Howard merely wanted to 
check his identity because of the activity he observed which he 
interpreted as an attempt to hide something. The vehicle in which 
Schlosser sat waiting was already lawfully stopped for a traffic 
violation.1 The issue here is whether an officer may approach a 
passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle to ascertain his identity 
and request information about his activities which appear 
suspicious. 
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U.S. 106 (1977), is instructive. 
There, the Court held that a peace officer may request the driver 
of a vehicle, stopped for a mere traffic violation, to step out of 
the vehicle with no indication of other unlawful activity 
whatever. The Court characterized the intrusion as "de minimus", 
as "at most a mere inconvenience", and as one which "hardly rises 
to the level of a fpetty indignity1." 434 U.S. at 111. The Court 
1 Defendants did not challenge in the lower court the validity of 
the initial traffic stop. 
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held that a generalized concern for the officer's own safety, 
arising from the percentage of police shootings that occurred when 
an officer approached a suspect seated in a vehicle/ without any 
evidence of danger in the particular case, was sufficient to 
justify requiring every driver stopped for a traffic violation to 
get out of the car. 
Some state courts have applied the Mimms analysis to 
cases similar to this one. In State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888 
(Minn. 1978) , police officers stopped a car which they observed 
driving the wrong way in their lane of traffic on a divided 
highway shortly after they had received a radio report of a 
robbery in the area. Nothing was known by the officers that 
connected this car to the robbery. The driver stepped out of the 
stopped car and met one of the officers halfway between the two 
vehicles. When the driver was unable to produce identification/ 
the officer walked up to the passenger side of the car to talk to 
the passenger. Unable to see inside the car, the officer opened 
the car door and, upon doing sof saw a gun which he grabbed. 
He then removed the passenger and patted him down. 
The Ferrise court reasoned: 
If an officer orders a driver to get out 
of his car, as in Mnmis, what he in effect is 
doing is also ordering the driver to open the 
door, because that is generally the only 
reasonable way a person can get out of a car. 
Operationally then, there is little practical 
difference between ordering a driver to open 
his door and get out of his carf on the one 
hand, and opening the door for the driver and 
telling him to get outf on the other. In 
this case, if the driver had not gotten out 
of the car on his own, the officer could have 
opened the door and told him to get out. 
While the Mimms case involved only the 
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right to order a driver to get out of the 
car, the HimnLS analysis would seem also to 
justify a policy of ordering passengers out. 
The same concern of the officers for their 
own safety applies, and the intrusion on the 
rights of the passengers occasioned by being 
required to get out of the car is no greater 
than the intrusion on the rights of the 
driver. 
[3] In this casef the officer who 
opened the door and told the passenger to get 
out did not testify that he did this pursuant 
to any policy or out of any concern for his 
own safety. The officer, however, had a good 
reason for going back to the car and talking 
to the passenger. Specifically, he wanted to 
see if the passenger could aid them in ac-
curately identifying the driver so a license 
check could be made. Since the car was 
covered with snow and the officer could not 
see the passenger, the officer simply opened 
the door. While he probably could have 
tapped on the window to get the passenger1 s 
attention, we fail to see how this action in 
opening the door in order to talk with the 
passenger could be deemed unreasonable, 
especially when under the MmnLS holding he 
probably could have done so whether or not he 
had a particular reason for wanting to talk 
to the passenger. 
We hold that the intrusion into the 
passenger1s privacy was minimal and that it 
may not prevail when balanced against the 
important public interests involved. The 
test is the reasonableness of the intrusion 
under all the circumstances, and in this case 
the minimal intrusion was completely 
reasonable and proper. 
269 N.W.2d at 890-91. Similarly, Officer Howard had good reason 
to approach Schlosser and ask for identification. Howard thought 
Schlosser was attempting to hide something from Howard's view. 
Initially, Howard only wanted to talk to Schlosser and merely 
opened the door to facilitate conversation, after he tapped on 
the closed window, and asked for identification. At this point, 
there had been no seizure or detention of Schlosser who sat 
inside a truck that was validly stopped for a traffic offense. 
The intrusion was minimal and reasonable under the circumstances. 
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Schlosser was not asked to get out of the truck un t i l 
Howard saw the marijuana in the door pouch, even though, under the 
above ana lys i s , Howard could have requested Schlosser to get out 
of the truck to r e s t r i c t h is po ten t ia l access to weapons without 
having seen the contraband. Once Howard discovered the marijuana, 
everything which followed was based upon probable cause as a 
r e s u l t of the p la in view s igh t ing . £>££ State v. Gallegos, 23 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23, 24-25 (1986); See also People v. Bradi , 437 N.E.2d 
1285 (111. App. 1982) (Ordering passenger out of stopped car not 
se izu re ; subsequent seizure of cocaine dropped by passenger and 
search of car lawful) ; S ta te v. Williams. 371 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 
App. 1979) (ordering passengers out of stopped car not s e i zu re ; 
subsequent se izure of gun from passenger lawful ) . Notably, 
defendants conceded in the lower court tha t if Howard1s i n i t i a l 
approach to Schlosser was lawful, then the subsequent discovery of 
marijuana cons t i tu ted probable cause based upon p la in view 
observations for the further search of the truck cab. ,£££ R. 37. 
Because Howard's walking up to the t ruck, opening the 
door and asking for i den t i f i c a t i on was not a seizure of Schlosser, 
but was a minimal in t rus ion tha t was reasonable under the 
circumstances, Schlosser1s cons t i tu t iona l r igh t s were not 
v io l a t ed . The lower court erred, therefore , in finding such a 
v io l a t ion and in suppressing the evidence. 
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POINT II 
EVEN IP THE OFFICER SEIZED SCHLOSSER, 
THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
A. The Standard Employed by t h e 
Lower Court On the Issue of the 
of the Val id i ty of the Inves t iga t ive 
Detention Was Erroneous. 
The appropriate standard for investigative detentions 
was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. 
QhlSl, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 
(1979); and is codified in Utah as follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense 
and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982). £J££ 3LS£ United States v. 
E££ald£r 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v, Merritt, 
736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984); State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 
(Utah 1985). The reasonable suspicion standard also applies to 
investigative stops involving vehicles. United States v. Sharpe, 
U.S. , , 105 S.Ct. 1568f 1573 (1985). 
Under the Fourth Amendment thenf the trial court erred 
in suppressing evidence based upon application of a probable cause 
standard. The independent question remains, however, whether the 
evidence was properly suppressed under Art. I § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
As argued in Point I, there is no good reason why this 
Court should construe this provision more narrowly than the Fourth 
Amendment has been interpreted so as to undermine the reasonable 
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suspicion test for investigative detentions which has heretofore 
been applied in Utah under the Fourth Amendment and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-7-15 (1982)• £££ e.g.. Swanigan. 699 P.2d at 718. 
That test reflects a reasonable and workable approach 
to the question of when a police officer may approach an indi-
vidual to investigate suspected criminal activity. It adequately 
protects an individuals right under Art. I § 14 to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures because it requires that the 
officer entertain a reasonable suspicion that the individual was, 
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. 
Among the governmental interests protected by the 
reasonable suspicion test contained in § 77-7-15 are effective 
crime prevention and detection. Law enforcement officers must be 
able, nin appropriate circumstances, and in an appropriate manner 
[to] approach a person for purpose of investigating possibly 
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make 
an arrest," United States v» Placer 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983), 
quoting Terryf 392 U.S. at 22, in order to protect these 
governmental interests. 
In his order dated January 9, 1986 (see Appendix A), 
Judge Harding characterized the motion to suppress as being based 
on a lack of probable cause to detain and search Schlosser. Judge 
Harding then went on to find that the officer based the detention 
and search "on a mere suspicion that the defendant was engaged in 
criminal activity." Apparently, Judge Harding employed the 
probable cause standard to determine the validity of the 
detention. 
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Arguablyf Judge Harding may have meant t ha t a "mere 
suspicion" was something l e s s than a reasonable suspicion f and, 
thus , have based h i s decision on the appropriate standard. 
Howeverf in l i g h t of his pre textual charac te r iza t ion of the 
issue as the existence of probable cause and h is f a i l u r e to c i t e 
§ 77-7-15 of the Utah Code, t ha t i s unl ikely . At the l e a s t , Judge 
Harding's rul ing i s unclear. This Court should remand t h i s case 
to the D i s t r i c t Court with ins t ruc t ions tha t the appropriate 
standard be applied. 
B. If the Court Had Employed the 
Reasonable Suspicion Test then 
The Evidence Would Not Properly 
Have Been Suppressedt 
Howard's approach of Schlosser closely f i t s the second 
category of allowable police contact se t out in United S ta tes v. 
Mer r i t t . 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir . 1984) and quoted in Point I , 
above. This i s the Terry stop category. To ju s t i fy the detention 
of Schlosser, Howard must have had "a reasonable suspicion, based 
on object ive f a c t s , tha t the individual [was] involved in criminal 
a c t i v i t y . " S ta te v. Swaniganf 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985); 
quoting Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-7-15 (1982). The reasonableness of the detention must be 
judged by an objective standard, i . e . , "would the fac ts avai lable 
to the officer a t the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant 
a man of reasonable caution in the b e l i e f tha t the action taken 
was appropriate?" Terry v, Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (196 8); £££ 
alSG State v . Car ter . 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Sept. 27, 1985). 
The United Sta tes Supreme Court has s t a t ed : 
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A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in 
order to determine his identity or to maintain 
the status quo momentarily while obtaining 
more information, may be most reasonable in 
light of the facts known to the officer at 
the time. 
Adams v> Williamsr 407 u.s. 143 (1972). ££& ALSG: State v. 
IQLL&S, 29 Utah 2d 269f 508 P.2d 534 (1973). The temporary 
detention is an "intermediate response" so that a police officer 
"who lacks . . . probable cause to arrest [need not] shrug his 
shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape." 
AdmSr 407 U.S. at 143. 
This Court also said tha t : 
When a police officer sees or hears conduct 
which gives rise to a suspicion of crime, 
he has not only the right but the duty to 
make observations and investigations to 
determine whether the law is being violated; 
and if so, to take such measures as are 
necessary in the enforcement of the law. 
State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1977); State v, 
Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (1980). 
This Court also considered the "informal arrest" or 
stop and detention situation in State v. xorres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 
508 P.2d 534 (1973). In that case, the Court said, "that the test 
to be applied on the question as to whether" appellant's 
constitutional rights have been abridged: 
. . . is one of reasonableness: that is, 
whether fair-minded persons, knowing the 
facts, and taking into consideration not 
only the rights of the individuals involved 
in the inquiry or search, but also the 
broader interests of the public to be 
protected from crime and criminals, would 
regard the conduct of the officers as being 
unreasonable [footnote omitted]. 
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29 Utah 2d a t 2 7 1 , 508 P.2d a t 5 3 6 . .£££ alfifi: Tprry v . Ohio, 
supra. Furthermore, 
The determination should be made on an 
object ive standard: whether from the fac t s 
known to the of f icer , and the inferences 
which f a i r l y might be drawn therefrom, a 
reasonable and prudent person in h is 
pos i t ion would be j u s t i f i e d in bel ieving 
tha t the suspect had committed the offense. 
Sta te v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 p.2d 
1295 (1972). 
State v . Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
This Court has also s ta ted t h a t : 
. . . i t i s e s sen t i a l tha t a reasonable degree 
of tolerance be indulged as to the judgment 
of police o f f i ce r s , so long as they are acting 
in good fa i th and within the standards of 
decent and decorous behavior. 
Sta te v. Torres , 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534, 536 (1973). 
F ina l ly , although Howard apparently f e l t no def in i te 
physical fear of Schlosser, there i s : 
no legal requirement t ha t a policeman must 
feel "scared" by the th rea t of danger. 
Evidence tha t the officer was aware of 
suf f ic ien t spec i f ic fac ts as would suggest 
he was in danger s a t i s f i e s the cons t i tu t iona l 
requirement . . . so long as i t i s clear tha t 
he was aware of speci f ic f ac t s which would 
warrant a reasonable person to bel ieve he 
was in danger. 
United Sta tes v. Tharpe. 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976); £££ 
also Sta te v. Roybal. 28 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (1986). 
The a r t i cu l ab l e f ac t s known to Howard and se t forth 
above object ively j u s t i f i e d a temporary detention of Schlosser to 
determine if he was involved in criminal a c t i v i t y . An object ive 
person with ten years of law enforcement experience, JSJ££ ftoybal, 
28 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10; Brinegar v. United S t a t e s . 338 U.S. 160 
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(1949), would have entertained the same suspicions on viewing 
Schlosser moving around and nervously glancing over his shoulder, 
especially in light of Lowder's apparent attempt to keep the 
officer away from the truck cab. Although Trooper Howard did not 
say so at the hearingf he could also have thought that what 
Schlosser was hiding was a weapon that could easily be used 
against himself or others. Certainly, a reasonably prudent person 
would have entertained the thought. The fact that Howard asked 
about weapons indicates that he did think about it at the time. 
In a very similar casef State v. Willis. 320 N.W.2d 726 
(Minn. 1982), the Minnesota Supreme Court found no constitutional 
violation. Theref a highway patrolman stopped a car for speeding. 
As the car pulled over and slowed to a stopf the officer saw one 
of the passengers "lean forward/ turn around and look back and 
then lean forward again." Id. at 727. The driver got out and met 
the officer part way between the two cars. The officer then 
walked up to the car to find out what the passenger had been 
trying to hide. He saw a lifelike rubber mask on the floor and 
asked the two passengers to get out. He then saw a gun partially 
protruding from under the seat and reached for it. As he did so, 
one of the passengers attempted to escape. The officer caught him 
and arrested him. 
On appeal, the defendant-passenger argued that 
furtive movements were insufficient £o establish probable cause. 
The court said: 
At a minimum. Officer Steffen was 
justified in going up to the car and 
investigating further. In State v. Landon, 
256 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 1977), we upheld the 
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practice of police officers routinely shining 
flashlights through the windows of cars 
lawfully stopped for speeding. £ae aljsa 
State v. Vohnoutka. 292 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 
1980); 1 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure. § 
2.2(b) (197 8). Officer Steffen had a more 
specific reason for talking with defendant: 
defendant had acted suspiciously as if he 
were trying to conceal something. . . . 
Given the time, place and the 
circumstances, Officer Steffen clearly was 
justified in ordering the passengers out in 
order to get them away from what might well 
be a weapon under the seat. . . . by the time 
Steffen initiated the search, he clearly had 
probable cause to believe that the car 
contained a gun. Standing where he had a 
right to stand when he ordered the passengers 
out, Steffen saw, in open view, the clip of 
the gun protruding from under the seat. At 
this point, he had probable cause to believe 
that there was a gun under the seat. The 
additional legal predicate for entering the 
car and seizing the gun may be found in the 
automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement, as well as in Steffen1s right to 
seize the gun to make sure that no one could 
use it against him. 
320 N.W.2d at 728. Based upon all of the circumstances. Officer 
Howard was justified in approaching Schlosser for further 
investigation. Minimally, he had a right to approach the truck to 
investigate further. If opening the door and asking for identi-
fication was in fact a detention, it was based upon Howard's 
reasonable suspicion that there was something in the truck that 
defendants wanted to hide from himjeither weapons or evidence of 
crime. Opening the door to talk with Schlosser was not an 
unreasonable intrusion where the window was closed and Howard 
had already attempted to get Schlosser1s attention by tapping 
on the window. At this point, Howard would have been justified 
under the above analysis in ordering Schlosser out of the truck. 
His subsequent detection of the odor of marijuana and discovery of 
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marijuana in the door pouch for which Howard a r res ted defendants 
ce r t a in ly j u s t i f i e d the fur ther search of the truck cab for 
weapons, which revealed the second package of marijuana, and the 
search of Schlosser f s bulging pants pocket. This i s e spec ia l ly so 
where the occupants, as here , have admitted t h a t there are weapons 
within the veh ic l e . The remaining evidence was discovered as the 
r e s u l t of an inventory search, the v a l i d i t y of which i s not a t 
i s sue here . The lower cou r t ' s suppression of the evidence was 
consequently erroneous and should be reversed. 
POINT III 
ALTERNATIVELY, IP SCHLOSSER1S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED, 
IT WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION 
COMMITTED IN BAD FAITH. 
F i n a l l y , Howard's d e t e n t i o n of S c h l o s s e r , even if not 
based upon a r easonab le s u s p i c i o n , was not a s u b s t a n t i a l v i o l a t i o n 
of S c h l o s s e r 1 s f o u r t h amendment or A r t . I § 14 r i g h t s a s r e q u i r e d 
for suppres s ion under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(g) (1982) . 
The d e t e n t i o n was minimally i n t r u s i v e and l a s t e d no longer than 
reasonab ly necessa ry t o e f f e c t i t s purpose—to a s c e r t a i n 
S c h l o s s e r 1 s i d e n t i t y . Nor, was t h e r e evidence t h a t Sch losse r was 
de t a ined i n bad f a i t h . 
Absent a showing of a s u b s t a n t i a l v i o l a t i o n or evidence 
of bad f a i t h , even wi thou t r easonab le s u s p i c i o n , Howard1s a c t i o n s 
should not r e s u l t in e x c l u s i o n of s u b s t a n t i a l , r e l i a b l e ev idence . 
&&& Uni ted S t a t e s v . Leon, U.S. , 104 s . c t . 3405 (1984) ; 
United S t a t e s v . Wi l l i ams . 622 F.2d 830 (5th C i r . 1980) (en b a n c ) , 
jE££±. dfmisd, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); £f. Harlow v, Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding t h a t , in c i v i l r igh t s ac t ions , 
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government o f f i c i a l s " a re s h i e l d e d from l i a b i l i t y for c i v i l 
damages i n so fa r a s t h e i r conduct does not v i o l a t e c l e a r l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d s t a t u t o r y or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of which a 
reasonab le person would have known"). The remedy for an 
i n s u b s t a n t i a l v i o l a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s does not l i e 
w i t h i n the c r imina l t r i a l through suppres s ion of the evidence but 
i s a c i v i l mat te r under Utah Code Ann. § 78-16-1 (Supp. 1985) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing f t h e S t a t e r e q u e s t s t h i s Court 
to f ind t h a t t h e evidence was ob ta ined wi thout v i o l a t i n g 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s and t o remand the case t o the 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t for t r i a l with an order t h a t t h e evidence not be 
excluded. 
DATED t h i s j?>#_ day of Mayf 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
At torney General 
/ / S A N D R A L 
(/ A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
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ADDENDUM 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH JA" * 2 198G 
Ai: :g
 ft Rounc'y, Cierk^LDpp.lty 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE 
Case No. 3 1 2 - C 
HARRIS LOWDER and 
ANTHONY PRICE SCHLOSSER, 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for consideration on the defendant's pre-trial 
Motion to Suppress certain evidence procurred by the State as a result of 
the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of the defendants and search of the 
automobile. The basis of the motion was that the evidence was seized as 
the result of the seizure and search of the Defendant Schlosser without 
probable cause, and the subsequent search of the automobile. The motion 
was based on a violation of both the United States and Utah Constitutional 
provisions, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The motion was submitted on facts stipulated to by both sides and on 
memorandums in support of their respective positions. 
J,*-
The Court finds as follows: 
1. The police officer had no valid reason to order the defendant 
Schlosser out of the automobile or to request Schlosser to empty 
his pocket and search the automobile. 
2. Any action taken by the police officer with regards to 
Defendant Schlosser was based on a mere suspicion that the 
defendant was engaged in criminal activity. 
3. All evidence subject of the motion to suppress was discovered 
as a direct consequence of the illegal detention and search of 
Defendant Schlosser and the automobile. 
A. The Court finds, as required by Utah Code Anno. 77-35-12(g)( 1) 
that the violation of the defendants constitutional rights was 
substantial and finds that the officer did not act in good faith, 
and so finds by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The basis for this finding is that the police officer acted without a 
legitimate law enforcement purpose and further that to allow the conduct 
of a peace officer under the circumstances of this case would 
significantly erode Fourth Amendments protections. 
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DATED this 7^^ day offBocombfrf, 198^ 
RAY M.HARDING 
Judge of the District Court 
;#v^ 
Approved as to form: 
/ 
Attorney for Defendant Schio t osser 
La LONI F. DELAh 
Attorney for Defendant Lowder 
( 
~v, 
DONALD EYRE !/ 
Juab County Attorney 
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